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Summary: The article deals with phantom borders in electoral behavior in Poland. Being aware of  the already wide litera-
ture in this field, the author tries to fill a gap existing in the research by investigating scale as a factor determining phantom 
borders’ construction. Two historical-administrative regions, Wielkopolska and Pomorze (crossed by relict boundaries) were 
tested quantitatively and qualitatively. By employing double de-scaling (territorial and electoral) the author discovered that in 
both the macro and micro scales phantom borders are present, however, their construction and manifestation differs signifi-
cantly. Consequently, this finding brings a new perspective to phantom border studies, widening the currently dominating 
historical perspective (with its structural and normative dimensions) by adding a new element: scale. It seems to bring a new 
perspective in understanding the investigated processes.
Zusammenfassung: Der Beitrag setzt sich mit Phantomgrenzen im Bereich des Wahlverhaltens in Polen auseinander. Der 
bereits existierenden umfangreichen Literatur zu dieser Thematik durchaus bewusst, versucht der Autor eine Forschungs-
lücke durch Untersuchung der Skala (Mikro-/Makroebene) als vorausbestimmenden Faktor der Konstruktion von Phan-
tomgrenzen zu schließen. Die quantitative und qualitative Untersuchung wurde in zwei historisch-administrativen Regionen, 
Wielkopolska und Pomorze (durchschnitten von historischen Grenzen), durchgeführt. Durch den Einsatz einer De-scaling-
Methode (territorial und elektoral) stellt der Autor fest, dass sowohl in der Makro- als in der Mikroebene Phantomgrenzen 
vorhanden sind, obgleich sie sich in ihrer Konstruktion und Artikulation bedeutend unterscheiden. Im Endeffekt eröffnet 
dieses Ergebnis eine neue Perspektive für Phantomgrenzen-Studien, indem die derzeit vorherrschende historische Perspek-
tive (mit strukturellen und normativen Dimensionen) um das neue Element der Skalenebene erweitert wird.
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1 Introduction
Phantom borders are a phenomenon present in 
the everyday lives of many European states. In 
some cases, as in Ukraine, they are violently vis-
ible in political-territorial conflict, in others, as 
in Romania or Slovakia, they form a part of the 
ethnic-political relations with their neighbor. But 
it is mainly Poland where – due to its complicated 
territorial past – the debate on old, non-existent 
boundaries attracts not only academics, but also 
politicians, commentators, businessmen and ordi-
nary people.
The eighteenth century partitions of Poland 
deeply diversified its economic, political and cul-
tural realities in the Prussian/German, Russian and 
Austrian1) parts. This process was additionally sup-
plemented by post-Yalta border shifts and popu-
lation resettlements. Consequently, in contem-
porary Poland four zones can be identified when 
analyzing economic indicators, cultural habits or 
crime rates, and also – what is especially interest-
ing for an author who is a political scientist – po-
litical behavior (Bartkowski 2002). They reflect 
four different historical legacies and result in con-
temporary political processes. 
Most of the current studies on the above de-
scribed phenomena apply a macro-scale perspective, 
by concentrating on the state, its unity or diversity. 
They consider Poland as a single territorial-admin-
1) The name Austrian is used for the territories 
belonging to the Habsburg State (Austrian Empire and 
after 1867 to Austria-Hungary).
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istrative unit, crossed by detectable dividing lines. 
Those divisions are usually regarded as being iden-
tical to the administrative divisions on the regional 
level (voivodship – in Polish województwo). This leads 
to simplifications in the spatial-political mapping of 
processes analyzed. The author is, however, interest-
ed if these phenomena are noticeable on levels other 
than the macro level and, if so, if the pattern of polit-
ical behavior remains the same. And, as a result, how 
are historic borders reproduced in current political 
life, and how are they constructed or deconstructed 
by the actors involved? Finally, how can the phantom 
borders concept be developed with the help of scale 
manipulation to better explain the current political 
landscape of investigated territorial units?
This article presents the elements of a recently 
conducted research using a micro-approach, by in-
vestigating regional (Donaj 2013; GryGo and secler 
2010; Jańczak 2010; Jańczak 2013) and local units 
(Jańczak et al. 2013). It proposes double down-
grading of the investigation’s scale by reducing the 
territorial level and election type to explore tested 
phenomenon. Two Polish historic-administrative re-
gions (representing different types of historical tradi-
tions and different phantom borders) have been thus se-
lected: Wielkopolska (Greater Poland) and Pomorze 
(Pomerania). Electoral behavior (understood as par-
ticipation level and political preferences) in central 
and local voting were tested there at regional (voivod-
ship) and county (in Polish powiat) levels, which made 
it possible to draw a scale-related map of the histori-
cal borders’ relevance. The text is based on quanti-
tative analyses of electoral statistics, supported by a 
qualitative investigation (ten interviews conducted 
in 2011–2012 among the regional and local political 
elites in various parts of the investigated regions). 
Analytically, the concept of de-scaling frames the 
investigation, similarly to boundarization and fron-
tierization models, what results from still missing 
widely recognized border theory (Brunet-Jailly 2005; 
kolossov 2005; Payan 2014) or phantom border theory, 
that could more convincingly serve as a framework 
for analysis.
2 Phantom borders – towards conceptualiza-
tion
After the collapse of communism, a revival of 
border studies in the United States and Europe can 
be observed. Consequently the nature and trans-
formation of borders has been intensively inves-
tigated, also including historical borders in what 
today are politically homogeneous states. Border 
scholars are looking for a border theory that shall 
“render explanatory and predictive models” (Payan 
2014, 1), assuming often that “borders are sepa-
rate objects of social research” (Paasi 2005, 668). 
Phantom borders are understood in this paper – 
following their conceptualization developed with-
in the “Phantomgrenzen” project as – “former, 
predominantly political borders that structure to-
day’s world (…), historical spaces [that] persist or 
re-emerge”(Phantomgrenzen). As the author is es-
pecially interested in political behavior, and conse-
quently, manifestations of relict borders visible in 
political life, he concentrates on the influence of 
former political boundaries on this thematic field. 
The critical approach requires, however, two inter-
ventions here: answering the questions of the mu-
tual relations between border studies and the phantom 
border concept, as well as defining the reasons why 
historical borders re-emerge.
With regard to the former, the definition and 
approach to phantom borders shall be placed in the 
wider context of border studies. The phantom border 
concept seems to be related to the latest develop-
ments in the field of studying borders. A concep-
tual development in border studies, recently redesign-
ing the dominating approach, moved the attention 
of scholars towards understanding borders as so-
cial constructs. As vladimir kolossov remarks, a 
“boundary is not simply a legal institution designed 
to ensure the integrity of state territory, but a prod-
uct of social practice, the result of a long histori-
cal and geopolitical developments, and an impor-
tant symbolic marker of (…) political identity” 
(kolossov 2005, 652). This political identity is an 
outcome of the bordering process. ladis kristof 
sees a boundary as a “meeting place of two socio-
political bodies, each having its particular inter-
ests, structure, and ideology” (kristof 1959, 277). 
Political identities on the respective border sides 
are structured then by various powers. Borders are 
seen as “participation in a collective consciousness 
(rituals, customs, traditions, laws, historical knowl-
edge, and even language) associated with a particu-
lar territory” (o’dowd and wilson 2002, 19). 
This approach would mean that borders are 
complex phenomena of multidimensional composi-
tion. However, their transposition to phantom borders 
seems not to be automatic, and is not academically 
obvious. On the other hand, a careful investigation 
of already existing findings on the character of bor-
ders paves the way for a better understanding of 
phantom borders and their nature: they are rooted in 
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political boundaries and boundarization processes 
both in their historical and functional aspects. This 
conclusion makes it possible to concentrate on the 
second of the above indicated questions.
With regard to the latter (reasons for the re-
emergence of historical borders): from the perspec-
tive of history-present day relations, actual state 
borders are considered to be outcomes of historical 
processes. They are “reminders of the past, (…) the 
products of previous conquests, invasions, popu-
lation movements or treaties. Any redefinition or 
transformation of borders means engaging with the 
past” (o’dowd and wilson 2002, 8). One can as-
sume that state borders that have disappeared are 
characterized by very similar features, and also in 
their case changing the state of art is a game with 
(or against) historical developments.
Functionally, as stressed by scholars, old 
boundaries are hardly erasable due to several rea-
sons. As nail alkan points, “everywhere where 
borders have been removed new ones have to be 
created (…), keeping this in mind, borders have to 
be understood as boundaries enclosing a space of 
identification and orientation” (alkan 2002, 37). 
This happens because of the logic of the European 
integration, where borders devaluate (o’dowd and 
wilson 2002, 10), but where, at the same time, men-
tal (…) borders become more important (ehlers 
et al. 2001, 2). Relict borders constitute one of the 
ways of finding differences. Additionally, state re-
lated processes contribute to the process: the more 
safe the state borders are, the more visible the inter-
nal divisions are (o’dowd and wilson 2002, 17). 
Consequently, any form of bordering – also with 
regard to old borders – seems to be the key con-
cept for organizing political and social space. As 
david newman claims, “all borders share a com-
mon function to the extent that they include some 
and exclude many others”(newman 2003, 16). So 
one could conclude that phantom borders are (re)con-
structed as a form of virtual enclosure, and any 
“enclosure fosters a feeling of security and people 
prefer to live in familiar circumstances” (alkan 
2002, 37).
At the end, it shall be emphasized that scholars 
engaged in phantom border research are intensively 
looking for theoretical support in their investiga-
tion. Among various approaches, the concept of 
path dependency could be mentioned (Peters et al. 
2005), assuming that “history matters” in under-
stating current political processes (Page 2006) and 
concentrating on relations between continuity and 
change in them (Boas 2007).
3 Political, historical, geographical and ana-
lytical context
To conduct further investigations into the 
Polish case, several contextual remarks have to be 
made, framing the analysis and settling it in the 
wider political, spatial and historical landscape of 
Poland.
First of all, the political ruptures in Poland are 
reflected in the ruling political options at the cen-
tral level. In the 2001–2005 period, the Polish po-
litical scene was dominated by the social democrats 
(rooted in post-communist traditions), the SLD 
(Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – Democratic Left 
Alliance). In 2005–2007 it was marked by conser-
vative governments, PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 
– Law and Justice), since 2007 by liberals, PO 
(Platforma Obywatelska – Civic Platform). Those 
three political orientations have dominated the po-
litical scene both at the central and local levels in 
Poland. 
Secondly, there is the location of the 
above-mentioned four zones (Fig. 1). Prussian/
German Poland (no. 1) contained three regions 
((Eastern) Pomorze, Wielkopolska and Górny 
Śląsk – Upper Silesia) in the nineteenth century, 
ethnically mainly Polish at that time, but sharing 
a century long tradition of neighboring Germany 
and exposed to German influences. Russian Poland 
(no. 2) consisted of central and eastern regions, 
with the capital – Warsaw – and was also dominat-
ed by Poles and Polish culture in the nineteenth 
century. Austrian Poland (no. 3) was located in the 
southern part of the country, around Cracow, and, 
similarly to the previous two, being Polish in terms 
of culture and language. All three belonged to 
their respective empires in the nineteenth century. 
Finally, the post-German (the name applied to the 
lands given to Poland after the end of the Second 
World War) territories (no. 4) were, by 1945, eth-
nically and politically German. They were granted 
to Poland as compensation for the Polish eastern 
provinces which were transferred to the Soviet 
Union after the end of the Second World War. The 
German population fled and was expelled, and re-
placed by Polish settlers from the east (previously 
exposed to Russian influences).
Thirdly, the electoral map of Poland, when ana-
lyzing parliamentary and presidential voting in the 
last two decades, reveals territorially marked pref-
erences. As demonstrated by subsequent election 
results charts (for example Fig. 2), the western and 
northern regions (administratively voivodships) usu-
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ally opt for liberal/social democratic parties and 
candidates (so-called liberal Poland, in Polish Polska 
liberalna), the central and eastern provinces are 
dominated by conservative voters (so called solidary 
Poland, in Polish Polska solidarna2)). The borders (usu-
ally very sharp) of the indicated splits (not) surpris-
ingly correspond with the historical borders within 
the Polish state: the nineteenth century boundaries 
of Prussia/Germany, Russia and Austria ( Janicki 
et al. 2005). Additionally, post-German territories 
are also visible in this puzzle.
Fourthly, despite different interpretations, 
interdependence between historical borders and 
actual electoral behavior (participation level and 
political preferences) is widely recognized as an 
explanatory factor. It is related to the nineteenth 
century as a period of the creation of modern na-
tions and states, with all their consequences for 
power structures within the states’ borders. It 
shall be stressed that the implementation of the 
2) The idea of solidary Poland refers to the concept of 
solidarity and the opposition movement of Solidarity – 
collective action based on mutual support and strong 
social ties.
Westphalian state model by European powers led 
at that time to the disintegration of Poland at the 
end of the eighteenth century. The legal and polit-
ical consolidation and centralization of the partition 
states within their borders resulted in a weakening 
of what had belonged to the Polish legacies. In the 
following decades, Polish territories were treated as 
a Prussian-Russian-Austrian borderland. However, 
centripetal tendencies (related to the consolidation 
of those states) boundarized ( jones 1959) the pre-
viously existing frontiers (kristof 1959). Internal 
standardization within the three empires was visi-
ble in different economic models, language and cul-
tural influences (Germanization and Russification 
policies), but also in the proliferation of specific 
political norms and values organizing public life in 
the three states, especially the principle of the rule 
of law in Germany, of tsarist autocracy (самодержа-
вие) in Russia, and parliamentarianism in Austria. 
The Polish territories followed the development 
paths of their respective capitals.
Fifthly, in looking for explanations for the 
existence of phantom borders in contemporary 
Polish political life, researchers have proposed 
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Fig. 1: Voivodeships of  Poland and historical borders
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dimensions can be identified within those efforts: 
structural and normative3). The former stresses ob-
jectively existing differences in economic develop-
ment levels (higher in western and northern Poland, 
lower in central and eastern), economic models 
(industrial west versus rural east), infrastructural 
density, closeness to the western markets, and so 
on (zarycki 2000). The latter pays attention to the 
norms and values dominating in various parts of 
Poland, and resulting from the nineteenth centu-
ry political traditions of the powers occupying the 
Polish provinces (the German, Russian and Austrian 
Polands) as well as the displacement and re-settle-
ment of the population after 1945 (in the case of 
the post-German provinces) (raciBorski 1997). 
Those historical legacies were to contribute – in 
the interpretation of many political scientists – to 
different types of political culture in the four zones. 
The former is not the same as the latter, but forms 
the context for a specific type of development of 
political culture.
The author represents the norms and values ori-
ented school in the above presented debate, and is of 
the opinion, that in trying to categorize political be-
havior in the four Polish zones, a classical approach of 
political culture may be academically useful. In this 
view – after sidney verBa – political culture is “a 
system of empirical beliefs, symbols and values that 
define situation where political action takes place” 
(verBa 1965). lucian Pye describes it as a “sum of 
the fundamental values, sentiments and knowledge 
that give form and substance to political process” 
(Pye 1995). almond and verBa (1963) enumerat-
ed three types of political culture: parochial (low 
knowledge about the system and low involvement of 
individuals), subjective (individuals share knowledge 
and sensitivity towards the authorities’ activities and 
the functioning of the system, however they still 
3) This distinction is supplemented in the literature 
in the reflections on mutual relations between both 
approaches, linking structure and norms. For example, 
functionalist political theory stresses “nationalization” 
of a state’s population by means of infrastructural 
linkages, but resulting in theories of indoctrination. 
Structural functionalism tries to relate one element of 
the social system to another (fisher 2010, 75). In the 
structural approach, legal and constitutional elements 
are stressed, which is visible in the policies of the 
executive. In the normative vision “political culture and 
political norms constitute images that a state transmits” 
(maoz and russett 1993, 625). Both explanations are 
considered not to be mutually exclusive, but rather 
present various facets of the investigated phenomenon 
(maoz and russett 1993, 625).
remain passive) and participatory (consciousness is 
followed by involvement). They can all be identified 
in the presented zones. This will be the approach ap-
plied in this text.
Unfortunately, the limitations of this publication 
do not allow the author to discuss more widely either 
the development of the concept of political culture, 
or the literature on voting behavior. It is, however, 
relevant to stress at least the main tendencies in both 
research fields.
In the case of the concept of political culture, 
three phases in approaching the issue can be enu-
merated here (street 1993, 97). The one initiated by 
almond and verBa (1963) (applied by the author) 
concentrated on civic culture and the link between 
individual’s behavior and the functioning of the sys-
tem. The second phase is constituted mainly by aca-
demic criticism and the development of the concept, 
seeing, among others, political culture not as a cause 
but as an effect of political processes, and stressing 
that the concept does not explain how it is created 
and how political socialization happens (street 
1993, 100–101; Barry 1978, 51–52). The third phase 
is the rediscovery of the concept in the 1980s, wid-
ening the understanding of political culture, includ-
ing, for example, emotions and beliefs that constitute 
specific meaning for political processes (rose 1980), 
attitudes allowing interpretation of politics (street 
1993, 103), or even popular culture. Individuals not 
only passively obtain ideas, they also select what they 
obtain depending on the context (Beetham 1991). 
Still, however, those approaches stress the explana-
tory power of culture “in the way in which interests 
are identified and then acted upon” (street 1993, 
113). This has been demonstrated by the enormous 
interest of researchers in political culture as a tool 
for explaining the transformation and democratiza-
tion processes in Central and Eastern Europe after 
the collapse of communism, often using traditional 
approaches. The model of almond and verBa “pro-
vides sufficiently universal tools to begin making 
sense of people’s orientations toward political objects 
in Central and Eastern Europe” (Pettai 2007, 92). 
Another question posed was if the old cultural pat-
terns change rapidly under circumstances of trans-
formation or rather tend to remain stable (Bernik 
and malnar 2003, 200–201).
The wide literature on voting behavior should 
also be mentioned here. Investigators try to extract 
determinants of how decisions in electoral activities 
are made, testing various factors. Simplifying the 
categorization it can be stated that at least two oppo-
site grand schools are present in the debate: stress-
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ing the role of rationality and non-rational elements 
in voting behavior (norris 2004, 6). The latter is 
the perspective where, among others, the concept 
of culture is researched, including political culture. 
The former is represented, for example, by ratio-
nal choice institutionalism. Scholars of each of the 
schools (and often of both of them) test electoral be-
havior, concentrating on various factors, such as the 
influence of political information (hoBolt 2005), 
formal rules (norris 2004, 6), party, individual and 
issue orientation (camPBell et al. 1954), social class 
or ethnic group belonging, previous electoral activ-
ity (green and shachar 2000), and many others.
Finally, a remark has to be made, linking the 
above discussed phenomenon of electoral prefer-
ences and the concept of political culture. The ques-
tion is whether the historical legacies bring not only 
various levels of participatory political culture, but 
also a more plural political culture? This is in fact 
the question of whether culture defines the environ-
ment, or if it also leads to clear voting preferences? 
This issue could be solved by comparing not only 
the winners or the strongest party (as presented 
above) but more or less the whole ‘palette’ of politi-
cal options that gain support in the given regions.
For example, when comparing the position of 
PiS in the Russian and Austrian Polands and PO and 
SLD in the German Poland and post-German terri-
tories, one can see an interesting regularity. Using 
the example of presidential elections in 2010, it can 
be noticed that in the first round Kaczyński got 
support of between 40% and 55% in the eastern 
and southern regions (getting over 50% in one of 
them), and between 24% and 32% in the northern 
and western regions. Komorowski, in turn received 
between 29% and 37%, and between 45%–52% 
(getting over 50% in three of them). The candidates 
of other parties and committees (there were 10 alto-
gether) attracted the support of about only 1%–2% 
per candidate, with exception of the SLD candidate 
who gained almost 14%. His votes were concen-
trated in German Poland and the post-German ter-
ritories (Fig. 2 a). This reveals the more pluralistic 
political culture in those regions, with a clearly lib-
eral profile, and an openness, with a wider spectrum 
of candidates. In Russian and Austrian Polands the 
culture is less pluralistic, with more polarized politi-
cal preferences.
The parliamentary elections reveal a similar pat-
tern (Fig. 2b). In 2007, PO dominated in the North 
and West, with support of between 45% and 58% 
(counted at the level of electoral constituencies) and 
PiS won in the rest of Poland, gaining between 35% 
and 51% of the votes. Only two other parties got the 
support higher than 1.5%, the alliance of left-wing 
parties got over 13%, mainly in German Poland and 
the post-German territories, PSL mainly in the oth-
er regions. The elections in 2011 confirmed these 
regularities.
Those two examples more open up this aspect 
of investigation than allows the author to formulate 
clear conclusions. They definitely show once again 
the existence of phantom borders, visible in various 




































Fig. 2: Results of  the presidential elections 2010 (a) and the parliamentary elections 2007 (b)
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tially stronger in the North and West than PiS in the 
East and South, but on the other hand, the former 
competes there with stronger competitors than the 
latter in their own areas of domination.
4 The sample: Pomorskie Region and 
Wielkopolskie Region
The above described tendencies in electoral be-
havior are usually related to the regional scale (in 
practice, the macro-scale), where the borders of re-
gions often correspond with the phantom borders in 
Poland. However, an empirical look shows that this 
is not always so. There are some cases where his-
torical divisions cut through homogeneous admin-
istrative units (Fig. 1.). Two regions: Pomorze and 
Wielkopolska represent the case.
Both the Pomorskie and Wielkopolskie Regions 
(see Fig.1 and in detail Fig. 3) are ancestors of the 
regional traditions of the first and second Polish re-
publics. They existed then as administrative units 
with very specific economic, cultural and linguistic 
profiles. Both were incorporated in the Prussian/
German state. Both were granted regional self-gov-
ernance in the interwar period (which was the case 
of only three Polish regions at that time). Both were 
reduced in terms of territory during the communist 
period and finally reconstructed in something ap-
proaching their historical spatial forms as a result of 
the 1999 administrative reform aiming at decentral-
ization. Finally, both are populated by communities 
sharing a strong regional identity, based on both his-
toric legacies and current developments, and some-
times characterized by a feeling of superiority over 
other Polish provinces, especially those in the east.
Today’s Pomorskie Region is inhabited by 
about 2.2 mln residents, who are concentrated in 
the metropolitan area of Gdańsk (Danzig), Gdynia 
and Sopot, the Vistula River valley and the city (in 
Polish miasto) of Słupsk. It is administratively di-
vided into 20 counties and 4 cities. The region is 
dynamically developing, based on both maritime 
industries and services, as well as on tourism and 
education (Strategia).
In terms of the most recent history, the Pomorskie 
region consists of three parts (Fig. 3: the central strip 
(forming a part of the Polish state in the interwar 
period, and being Slavic at that time, inhabited by an 
ethnic group of Kashubians), no. a, the Free City of 
Gdańsk (an independent city governed by the league 
of Nations and mainly ethnically German by 1945), 
and two parts in the eastern and western parts of the 
region (belonging to the German state by the end 
of the Second World War and ethnically German), 
no. b. As a consequence of the war, and then the 
Potsdam Conference, the German population fled 
and was expelled (Piskorski 2013), the empty spac-
es in the region were re-inhabited with Polish set-
tlers mainly expelled from the former eastern Polish 
provinces that were transferred to the Soviet Union 
(nitschke 1999). Consequently the central part of 
the region represents Polish/Kashubian traditions 
of a long-residential character, strongly influenced 
by nineteenth century Prussian/German political 
and cultural legacies. The western and eastern parts 
share a migratory character and are rooted in the 
eastern Polish type of politics and culture. 
The Wielkopolskie Region has 3.4 million in-
habitants, concentrated mainly in the metropolitan 
area of Poznań, and then around other bigger cities 
(Leszno, Konin, Piła, Kalisz). The region consists 
of 35 counties (including 4 cities). The economy of 
the region is based on industry and services located 
mainly in the metropolitan areas, as well as on ag-
riculture, also making it one of the most developed 
Polish regions. 
The actual region consists of three parts: the 
main one (belonging in the nineteenth century 
to the German state, but ethnically Polish at that 
time, no. x), the eastern outskirts (belonging in the 
nineteenth century to the Russian state but also eth-
nically Polish, no. y) and northern parts (by 1945 
a part of the German state and by then ethnically 
German, no. z). Consequently, in the first: Polish 
legacies with German influences dominate, in the 
second: Polish traditions influenced by Russian leg-
acies, and in the third: Polish resettlement traditions 
(related to the post-Second World War expulsion 
and resettlements).
5 The regions during parliamentary and 
presidential elections
The starting point for empirical investigation 
into political behavior is the central elections and 
the macro-level. In parliamentary and presiden-
tial elections, the political behaviors of the inves-
tigated regions inhabitants reveal the existence of 
phantom borders. Analyses locate both Pomorze and 
Wielkopolska in liberal Poland, characterized by rela-
tively high turnout and anti-conservative attitudes. 
Those two features can be comparably confronted 
with the Polish central and eastern provinces, where 
participation levels are lower and anti-liberal ten-
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dencies stronger. Political scientists tend to explain 
this phenomenon by the political culture dominat-
ing in both regions and resulting from nineteenth 
century Prussian/German influences. It is claimed 
that belonging to the Prussian/German state creat-
ed participative attitudes (contrary to parochial ones 
in the provinces under Russian rule) and openness 
towards western values.
The political profile of the regions in parlia-
mentary election reveals the more liberal character 
and higher voting participation in these regions 
than in the Poland-wide results (Tab. 1). Both SLD 
and PO gained more votes than average in both 
regions while turnout has always been higher than 
elsewhere.
The same tendency has been visible in the case 
of presidential elections (Tab. 2). Turnout is high-
er than the Polish average and liberal candidates 
(Donald Tusk, Bronisław Komorowski) collect 
more votes than in the central and eastern regions 
of Poland, where Lech and then Jarosław Kaczyński 
collected the majority of their votes.
5.1 Step one: territorial downscaling
However, still looking at parliamentary and 
presidential elections, when reducing the scale of 
the analyses and replacing region-average indica-
tors with a county level comparison, both regions 
are no longer homogeneous in terms of their po-
litical behavior and political preferences. Phantom 
borders, reflecting the German, Russian and popula-
tion replacement legacies, are visible in both partic-
ipation levels and political preferences. In the case 
of Pomorze, turnout is higher in the central part 
(representing Prussian/German legacies and more 
participative political culture) and lower in the west-
ern and eastern parts (re-settlement territories, with 
populations representing more parochial traditions). 
Similarly in Wielkopolska the eastern parts (Russian 
legacies) have been characterized by lower participa-
tion than the rest of the region. Also, the winning 
party or candidate varies locally. In Wielkopolska 
in 2005 PO won on the regional scale. However, in 
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Fig. 3: Phantom borders in the Pomorskie and Wielkopolskie Regions and voter turnout in the 2006 local elections at county 
level. Data source: Self-Government Elections 2006 and Jańczak et al. 2013
133J. Jańczak: Phantom borders and electoral behavior in Poland ... 2015
the biggest share of votes. Similarly, in the following 
elections, the east of the region revealed much higher 
support for PiS than the rest of the province, where 
it was very rarely chosen. In Pomorze the support 
for Tusk and Komorowski in the presidential elec-
tions was lowest in the central strip of the region. In 
Wielkopolska, Kaczyński won in the eastern coun-
ties, Komorowski in the rest of the region. 
The picture that can be drawn when investigat-
ing the regions is that in the case of state-level voting 
(parliamentary and presidential), phantom borders mark 
historical divisions. Prussian/German Poland (the cen-
tral strip of Pomorze and most of Wielkopolska) 
seems to represent a participative political culture, 
visible in the high turnout, whereas Russian and 
re-settlement Poland (eastern Wielkopolska and 
western and eastern parts of Pomorze) is dominated 
by more passive attitudes. At the same time, political 
preferences vary.
5.2 Step two: electoral downscaling
The question is, then, if the described phenom-
enon is also confirmed by other types of voting, 
such as local elections. If a political culture based 
on historical legacies determines participation lev-
els and political preferences, they should be similar-
ly visible also when testing other types of elections. 
This would mean at the same time a second de-scal-
ing of the analyses. Not only does the scale of ter-
ritorial units need to be reduced (from the regional 
to sub-regional level), but also the election type is 
downgraded by checking non-central voting. 
This methodological shift is based on the rich 
“scale research” literature, which, due to the form 
of this text, cannot be elaborated on further, (how-
ever it is widely debated by kaiser and nikiforowa 
2008, 538–541). The opinion seems to dominate 
in the literature recently that “the scale of analysis 
is not naturally determined, but represents a social 
construct” (kolossov 2005, 628). It is, however, 
important to notice that the state of art recognizes 
“scale [as] an active progenitor of specific social 
processes” (smith 1992) and assumes scales to be 
“arenas around which sociospatial power choreog-
raphies are enacted and performed” (swynGedouw 
2004). Research into scale in recent years has addi-
tionally brought a shift in analytical focus. Initially, 
they were “socially constructed as the actors that 
matter,” now it is usually considered “a category of 
practice performed by actors/actants” (kaiser and 
nikiforowa 2008, 541).
In the further investigation, the county-level 
local government elections were employed as a 
test of the presented phenomenon, and the elec-
tions in 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 were compared 
(National Electoral Commission).
Both turnout and winning political options 
were investigated, as reflecting participation levels 
and political preferences. To meet the methodologi-
cal postulate of comparability, only similar territo-
2001 2005 2007 2011
Winner Turnout Winner Turnout Winner Turnout Winner Turnout
Poland SLD 41% 46% PiS 27% 40% PO 41% 54% PO 39% 49%
Pomorskie SLD 36% 47% PO 40% 43% PO 55% 57% PO 62% 52%
Wielkopolskie SLD 46% 50% PO 38% 41% Po 44% 55% PO 55% 55%
Tab. 1: Parliamentary elections in Poland, Pomorskie and Wielkopolskie Regions
Source: The author (following National Electoral Commission, Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, http://pkw.gov.pl, visited: 01.02.2014)
2005(1) 2005(2) 2010(1) 2010(2)
Winner Turnout Winner Turnout Winner Turnout Winner Turnout
Poland Tusk 36% 50% Kacz 54% 51% Kom 41% 55% Kom 53% 55%
Pomorskie Tusk 49% 54% Tusk 57% 55% Kom 52% 58% Kom 65% 59%
Wielkopolskie Tusk 41% 51% Tusk 52% 51% Kom 47% 56% Kom 61% 54%
Tab. 2: Presidential elections in Poland, Pomorskie and Wielkopolskie Regions
Source: The author (following National Electoral Commission, Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, http://pkw.gov.pl, visited: 01.02.2014)
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rial units were compared. It was thus decided to 
eliminate the metropolises and leave the town-rural 
counties in the sample.
With regard to the turnout, phantom borders were 
again noticeable. In 2002 turnout nationally reached 
a level of 49%, while in Pomorskie it was 50%, in 
Wielkopolskie - 49%. In Pomorze the highest par-
ticipation was noted in Kartuski and Kościerski 
counties (59% and 58%) in the very core of the 
central strip. In Kwidzyński and Malborski in the 
east, it was about 15% lower (46% and 43%), in 
Słupski and Chojnicki in the west, about 10% lower 
(49% in both). In the central and northern parts of 
Wielkopolska, the turnout was about 48%. In the 
eastern counties however it was on average 6% high-
er – in Koniński 57%, in Kolski 53%! Consequently 
in Pomorze, the Prussian/German participative leg-
acies were visible in the central strip, while the re-
settlement eastern and western outskirts were more 
passive. In Wielkopolska, the Russian legacies in the 
eastern counties represented – surprisingly – more 
participative attitudes than the central part with 
Prussian/German traditions. This contradicts the 
previous interpretation based on elements of partici-
pative and parochial political culture on both sides 
of the former border.
In 2006 the national turnout was at the level of 
46%, while in both Pomorskie and Wielkopolskie it 
was 47%. In the former, again, in the central coun-
ties participation was about 10% higher, in the west-
ern and eastern ones about 5% lower. In the latter 
– also similarly to the previous election – the eastern 
counties represented on average 7% higher involve-
ment, than the rest of the province (Fig. 3). In 2010 
the national turnout reached the level of 50% and 
49% in both investigated regions. Local differences 
again revealed similar patterns. Similarly to the elec-
tions in 2014.
Political preferences also reflected phantom bor-
ders’ existence. In 2002 in Pomorskie, the majority 
of the competing committees pretended to have a 
local character, however many had, in fact, central 
affiliation, being linked to national political parties 
and organizations. In the central strip, however, lo-
cal Kashubian organizations received strong sup-
port (Kaszubskie Zrzeszenie Wyborcze or Samorządne 
Kaszuby – Naszé Sprawë ). SLD (ruling at that time in 
Poland) won the support of 20%–37% of voters in 
the western and eastern parts of the region and only 
about 15% in the central strip. In Wielkopolska, 
SLD gained roughly equal support of about one 
third of voters in all parts of the region and won 
the elections.
In 2006 the central authorities were dominated 
by PiS – it was the main component of the parlia-
mentary majority and of the central government. In 
Pomorze again the western and eastern parts sup-
ported SLD and additionally Samoobrona (a radical 
rural party). In the central strip PiS, PO and local 
committees dominated the scene. In Wielkopolska, 
again left wing and liberal committees dominated, 
regardless of the part of the region. At the same 
time, only in the east did Samoobrona gain signifi-
cant support (about 15%) and PiS collected almost 
no support (4% in comparison to 15%–20% in the 
other counties of the region).
In 2010 PO was in power at the central level. In 
Pomorskie, PO dominated in the central strip, in two 
counties winning an absolute majority of seats in the 
councils, local committees were also still strongly 
supported. In the west and east of the region the SLD 
achieved a relatively good result. In Wielkopolska, 
PO dominated in the central part of the region, the 
SLD and peasant parties in the eastern parts, where 
– by contrast – the liberals achieved a relatively weak 
result.
In 2014, it was still PO who ruled at the cen-
tral level, however, its position was weakening. In 
Pomorskie, the tendency from previous years was 
visible, especially with regard to the local commit-
tees in the central strip and the significant position 
of PO, but also PiS being much stronger (often the 
winning power) in the eastern and western outskirts, 
replacing SLD’s domination. In Wielkopolskie, PSL 
won the elections in almost all the counties, but in 
the east PiS was visibly the second power.
6 Interpretation
The above presented quantitative evidence dem-
onstrates the existence of phantom borders in Poland. 
A double de-scaling investigation, however, revealed 
that, despite the relatively stable location of the lines 
separating the historical legacies and political cul-
tures, electoral behavior (especially the participation 
level) is manifested differently at various levels of 
political life. Participative and parochial types seem 
to explain well the regional differences in central 
elections. But in the local level elections, different 
patterns can be also detected, which calls for further 
interpretation. 
With regard to participation levels, the case of 
phantom borders in Pomorze seems to be similarly con-
structed in both scales. But the reason why the east-
ern (representing Russian Poland legacies) outskirts 
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of Wielkopolska are more passive then the rest in 
parliamentary or presidential elections and more ac-
tive in local elections requires explaining. 
Interviews conducted in the eastern counties 
suggest an interesting explanation. Local leaders 
stress feelings of subordination and worseness in re-
lation to Wielkopolska proper. It is considered to be 
dynamic, well organized, representing German order. 
Consequently, it is admired and copied in the eastern 
counties. Local territorial units and populations tend 
to confirm their belonging to the province and desire 
to overcome, in their own eyes, the economic and 
political handicaps in this way. They try to decon-
struct the old border and overcome otherization from 
the main part of Wielkopolska. This can be achieved 
by shifting the phantom border to the eastern boundary 
of the current Wielkopolskie Region. This also re-
veals the basic function of the border – to separate – 
in this case, from the other Russian Poland provinces. 
One of the tools to achieve this aim is to exercise the 
rules and norms that are assigned to Wielkopolska 
and adopt the German political traditions. This re-
calls the neophyte syndrome, understood as being new to 
the environment and consequently experiencing the 
necessity of never-ending confirmation of one’s own 
belonging and loyalty to be entirely and finally accept-
ed.4) Participation in elections is one of the indicators 
of being a part of participative culture. However, 
central elections are differently perceived than local 
ones. The former belong to national political realities 
and are considered to be of exogenic nature. Local 
elections are reported to be something with a region-
al, endogenic character. 
Why, then, is the same mechanism not visible 
in the case of the western and eastern counties of 
Pomorze? As narrated by local elites, the central strip 
is also positively regarded, but as something alien, 
and at the same time unachievable. First, due to the 
resettlement tradition (contrary to the situation in 
Wielkopolska), second due to the ethnic situation 
and the Kashubian character of the territory. Borders 
– also phantom borders – are “self-perpetuating and 
resistant to change” (newman 2003) in this case. 
Regional unity is realistic when based on a common 
national standard and only political norms and val-
4) This explanation requires, however, further 
research, this time by upscaling the perspective and 
applying the comparative approach to the other 
territorial units located further in the east. A high 
level of participation in local elections is observable 
there as well, which cannot be explained with the same 
argumentation.
ues need to be adjusted across phantom borders. This 
cannot be the aim if historical legacies correspond 
with linguistic and ethnic peculiarities. The location, 
manifestation and re-construction of phantom borders 
remains an empirical reality.
Electoral preferences show fewer scale-related 
features. When – at the county level polls – Prussian/
German Poland opts mainly for liberals (similarly to 
the central elections), Russian Poland and post-Ger-
man Poland are much more open to socially oriented 
parties, sometimes of populist character. This can be 
the conservative PiS but also the social democratic 
SLD or even the radical rural Samoobrona party. 
Political culture can serve again as a convincing ex-
planation, revealing a less mature type of political 
orientation. More cohesive attitudes in inter-scale 
comparison suggest, however, the necessity of fur-
ther research. They should also include structurally 
oriented elements.
7 Conclusions
The presented investigation reveals several pe-
culiarities of phantom borders in Wielkopolska and 
Pomorze but also of the phantom borders themselves. 
Electoral borders resulting from historical legacies 
have consequences for actual political and social di-
visions. Historical spaces are reproduced in various 
ways in current electoral behavior. It is visible both 
on the macro and micro scale, however the pattern 
of political behavior does not remain exactly the 
same. Phantom borders are located in the same place 
in both scales. But double de-scaling (territorial 
and electoral) shows that political participation is 
variously constructed on both scales. In the macro 
perspective elements of parochial political culture 
in Russian and post-German (re-settlement) Poland 
result in lower turnout, compared to the Prussian/
German Poland’s participative political culture (re-
vealed in higher participation). In the doubly reduced 
scale in Wielkopolska this rule is reversed as an ele-
ment of relict border deconstruction and an attempt 
to shift it to the eastern outskirts of the region. It 
serves to find similarities on one side and differences 
on the other. Consequently, the inhabitants of the 
Russian part of Wielkopolska use phantom borders as 
tools for self-inclusion to the region proper and mark-
ing the more easterly territories as others, enclosing 
the region with a sharp historical-political legacy. In 
Pomorze this is impossible, so the line is maintained. 
The ethnic peculiarity of the Kashubian population 
makes any changes impossible, so scale change re-
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sults in confirming not only the relict border’s loca-
tion, but also the stable character of political behav-
ior it separates. Those findings on political behavior 
on respective sides of a former border are not only an 
empirical discovery, but also bring consequences for 
the concept of phantom borders. They reveal that scale 
manipulation can serve as a methodological tool to 
better explain the nature of phantom borders.
Finally, the presented considerations open up 
space for further investigation at the same time. 
Among other things, there are questions of whether 
the aforementioned phantomization is conducted con-
sciously or not by the actors involved, how present it 
is in the political discourse of politicians, and to what 
extent the historical interpretations of spatial factors 
shape their electoral strategies. And finally, whether 
the two investigated cases reflect processes that can 
be generalized and applicable to the other regions in 
Poland.
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